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HIS Article is intended to provide an updated summary of the
relevant Texas law regarding civil evidentiary issues and to high-
light the most significant developments in this area of law during
the Survey period.' Since the last survey, the Texas Supreme Court has
articulated when the "snap-back" rule can be used to retrieve documents
inadvertently provided to a party's testifying expert. Also, several appel-
late courts issued important decisions regarding expert disqualification,
the admissibility of settlement negotiations, and the introduction of a for-
mer client's affidavit as parol evidence challenging the terms of a law firm
engagement letter.
I. PRIVILEGE
In In re Christus Spohn Hospital Kleberg,2 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the applicability of the snap-back rule when attorney work
product has been inadvertently provided to a party's testifying expert. 3
In this medical malpractice action, the hospital inadvertently provided
privileged work product documents to its testifying expert and attempted
to retrieve the documents through the snap-back provision of Rule
193.3(d) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 The supreme court held
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1. The Survey period runs from October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2007. This article
is not intended to analyze all Texas cases dealing with civil evidence issues.
2. 222 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. 2007).
3. Id. at 439.
4. Id. at 436. Rule 193.3(d) provides:
A party who produces material or information without intending to waive a
claim of privilege does not waive that claim under these rules or the Rules of
Evidence if-within ten days or a shorter time ordered by the court, after the
producing party actually discovers that such production was made-the pro-
ducing party amends the response, identifying the material or information
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that the inadvertent nature of the production could only preserve the
privilege if the hospital's expert did not testify at trial.5
In balancing the tension between the snap-back provision that protects
privileged documents and the requirements regarding expert disclosure,
the supreme court reasoned that, so long as the hospital stood on its testi-
fying expert designation, Rule 192.3's plain language and certain policy
considerations that surrounded its amendment, compelled the conclusion
that the documents could not be snapped back. 6 The supreme court
noted that, under the former rule, privileged work product lost its pro-
tected status if the expert relied upon it as the basis for his or her testi-
mony.7 To avoid discovery disputes that frequently arose over what
material an expert may or may not have relied on, Rule 192.3 was
amended in 1999 to mandate the discovery of documents "that have been
provided to, [or] reviewed by" a testifying expert. 8 Further, the supreme
court noted that under Rule 192.5, 9 which governs testifying expert dis-
closure, documents provided to a testifying expert lose their work-prod-
uct designation irrespective of the intent that accompanied their
production because a jury is entitled to know what influenced the testi-
mony and opposing counsel must be provided with that information to
conduct an adequate cross-examination.1 0
After reviewing the federal expert-disclosure rule and other states' sim-
ilar rules, the supreme court found that given the importance expert testi-
mony can assume in a trial, and the corresponding concern that
documents reviewed by a testifying expert should be produced, the dis-
closure requirements of "Rules 192.3(e)(6) and 192.5(c)(1) prevail over
Rule 193.3(d)'s snap-back provision so long as the expert intends to testify
at trial."' I The supreme court articulated an exception to this rule, how-
produced and stating the privilege asserted. If the producing party thus
amends the response to assert a privilege, the requesting party must
promptly return the specified material or information and any copies pend-
ing any ruling by the court denying the privilege.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d).
5. In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d at 435. Rule 192.3(e) provides, in
pertinent part:
A party may discover the following information regarding a testifying expert
or consulting expert whose mental impressions or opinions have been re-
viewed by a testifying expert ... : (6) all documents, tangible things, reports,
models, or data compilations that have been provided to, reviewed by, or
prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of a testifying expert's
testimony.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e).
6. In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d at 436.
7. Id. at 438.
8. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e)(6)).
9. Rule 192.5 provides, in pertinent part:
Even if made or prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, the follow-
ing is not work product protected from discovery: (1) information discovera-
ble under Rule 192.3 concerning experts, trial witnesses, witness statements,
and contentions.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(c).
10. In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d at 439-40, 443.
11. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
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ever: if the inadvertently-producing party can show that the privileged
documents could not by their "nature" have influenced the expert's opin-
ion, then the expert-disclosure rule would not be implicated, and the
party could snap-back the documents under Rule 192.3(d) without sacri-
ficing their testifying expert. 12
The hospital argued that the expert had not sufficiently reviewed the
privileged documents so that they had not influenced the expert's opin-
ion.13 However, the Texas Supreme Court ultimately held that the trial
court correctly denied the request of the hospital to retrieve the docu-
ments because the testifying expert admitted that she "glanced" at the
documents to determine that they were not something she needed or
wanted to read, and it was unclear from the record to what extent she
reviewed them.14
II. RELEVANCE
A. SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS ADMISSIBLE TO DETERMINE
REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD
In Vernon v. CAC Distributors, Inc.,15 a case in which the Plaintiff
sought damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 16 the
First District Houston Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of
parties' settlement negotiations with respect to determining the reasona-
bleness of an attorneys' fee award.17 At the trial court, the plaintiff was
successful in her FLSA claim, garnering the entire $1,897.50 she pled in
overtime wages plus an identical amount in liquidated damages; thus, she
was entitled, as a matter of law, to her reasonable and necessary attor-
neys' fees and court costs.' 8 The trial court, therefore, awarded the plain-
tiff $5,550 in fees and costs. 19
On appeal, the employer did not challenge the award, but maintained
that the trial court correctly reduced the award of attorneys' fees to the
value of thirty hours, not ninety hours, because to award the value of the
full ninety hours was not "reasonable and necessary" as required under
the statute.20 In order to establish that ninety hours was unreasonable at
trial, the employer sought to admit evidence relating to the settlement
offers that it made to the plaintiff.21 Although an offer to settle or com-
promise a claim is normally not admissible, 22 the court of appeals held
12. Id. at 441.
13. Id. at 443.
14. Id. at 444-45.
15. No. 01-06-00009-CV, 2007 WL 2264455 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 9,
2007, no pet.).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
17. Vernon, 2007 WL 2264455, at *1.
18. Id. at *2 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
19. Id. This number represented one-third of $16,650 sought by Vernon's attorney,
calculated as ninety hours multiplied by his rate of $185 per hour. Id.
20. Id. at *4.
21. Id. at *5.
22. TEX. R. EVID. § 408.
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that the employer's evidence relating to the settlement offers was both
relevant and admissible in relation to the reasonableness of the attorneys'
fee award.2 3
The plaintiff first objected to the introduction of the settlement offers
on the basis of relevance. 24 In a bench trial, the trial court overruled this
objection, holding that the settlement offers were relevant because they
tended to make more probable the fact that the plaintiff's attorney had
spent more time than was reasonable and necessary to present the case
through to trial.25 The court of appeals agreed that the settlement pro-
posals were relevant, holding that because the three settlements were
greater than the cap on damages under the FLSA, they tended to prove
that more than thirty hours on the matter was unreasonable. 26 The plain-
tiff also objected to the admissibility of the settlement proposals under
Rule 408 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, which provides, "to prove liabil-
ity for or invalidity of the claim or its amount[,] [e]vidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissi-
ble."'27 The court of appeals, however, held that because Rule 408 "does
not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose,"
and because the settlement evidence was offered solely to "aid[] the
court in determining the reasonableness of Vernon's attorney fees," that
the settlement negotiations were admissible.28 Accordingly, because it
found that the settlement proposals were relevant and not barred by Rule
408 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, the court of appeals found that it was
not an abuse of discretion to admit the settlement proposals into
evidence. 29
B. RELEVANCE OF VALUE OF ASSIGNED LOAN
In In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp.,30 Pilgrim's Pride sought mandamus to
prevent discovery regarding documents concerning the amount it paid for
debt instruments of the plaintiff, PPR&M, on the grounds that the
amount paid was irrelevant. 31 During the underlying lawsuit, a suit on a
sworn account seeking damages from Pilgrim's Pride, plaintiff defaulted
on loans due to its former financing bank, Hibernia, who then intervened
in the lawsuit. 32 Subsequent to the intervention, Hibernia assigned the
loans to Pilgrim's Pride, and Pilgrim's Pride counterclaimed against
PPR&M to collect the amounts due under the assigned loans as an offset
against any amount it might owe on the underlying suit.33 Pilgrim's Pride




27. TEX. R. EVID. § 408.
28. Vernon, 2007 WL 2264455, at *5.
29. Id.
30. 204 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.).
31. Id. at 832-33.




argued that because "a holder of a promissory note is entitled to recover
the full amount due on the note regardless of what was paid for the as-
signment," "the amount paid for the assignment is irrelevant. '34 The
Texarkana Court of Appeals held that they could not determine that the
amount paid was not "patently irrelevant," as required for a court to issue
mandamus, even though it might prove inadmissible at trial.35 The court
held that, "[b]y pleading a counterclaim based on the assigned loans, Pil-
grim's Pride has placed the assigned loans in dispute."'36 Further, because
the transaction by which Pilgrim's Pride acquired the loans from Hibernia
"is the area of inquiry sought by PPR&M," there was a possibility that
the amount paid for the loans might be relevant, either to discern
whether any value was paid or to discern whether equitable relief might
be appropriate. 37 Thus, the court ruled that it was not an abuse of discre-
tion for the trial court to have compelled production.
38
C. INTRODUCTION OF SUPERSEDED PLEADINGS AS EVIDENCE OF
DISMISSAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS
In Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane,39 the parents of a
child injured during childbirth sued a hospital for negligence-related
claims, and the Texas Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of the
plaintiff's superseded pleadings. 40 At the trial court, the parents first
sued the hospital and two doctors who came to help provide emergency
assistance for the child; the parents, however, amended the petition by
nonsuiting the two doctors before the trial.41 Subsequently, the parents
"filed a motion in limine to prevent Bay Area from introducing into evi-
dence the superseded pleadings that listed Rothschild and Eubank [the
two doctors] as defendants."'42 Although neither side attempted to intro-
duce the superseded pleadings into evidence, each party discussed the
doctors' status during voir dire, and the two doctors testified at trial as to
their prior involvement in the case.43 The supreme court was careful to
note that the "McShanes' counsel was the first to mention the doctors'
party status during voir dire." '44
The threshold question in any evidentiary dispute is whether the evi-
dence is relevant, as only relevant evidence can be introduced at trial.
45
The supreme court noted that statements from pleadings can be excluded
34. Id. at 834 (citing Carter v. DeJarnatt, 523 S.W.2d 88, 90-91 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 835.
37. Id. at 835-36.
38. Id. at 836.
39. 239 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).




44. Id. at 233 n.1.
45. TEX. R. EvID. 402.
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if they are either irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. 46 However, the su-
preme court held that because plaintiffs' attorney was the first to mention
the doctors' status as a prior party, they could not then complain that the
doctors' testimony was irrelevant. 47 Because the McShanes opened the
door to what may have otherwise been irrelevant information, the su-
preme court held that rebuttal evidence on the issue was admissible.48
The Texas Supreme Court also addressed the McShanes' objection that
the superseded pleadings were inadmissible hearsay.49 The supreme
court recognized that a superseded pleading is an out-of court statement
that would normally be classified as inadmissible hearsay. 50 Looking to
the history of the Texas Rules of Evidence, the supreme court noted that
before the current version of the Rules of Evidence came into effect in
1983, relevant information in the pleadings was inadmissible unless incon-
sistent,51 as "cases required an inconsistency between the superseded
pleading and the party's position at trial" in order to be admissible. 52 The
supreme court further noted that, when a pleading is superseded, it no
longer constitutes a pleading and therefore no longer acted as a judicial
admission, which allows the pleading to be used at trial.53 However, since
the 1983 version of the Rules of Evidence came into effect, the Texas
Supreme Court has held that there is no longer any requirement that the
statement in the pleading be inconsistent with the party's position at
trial.54 The supreme court held that under Rule 801(e)(2) of the Texas
Rules of Evidence, "subject to any other Rules of Evidence that may
limit admissibility, any statement by a party-opponent is admissible
against that party. ' 55 Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
court of appeals erred in finding the superseded pleadings inadmissible,
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and rendered judgment
that the McShanes take nothing.56
III. HEARSAY
In Withrow v. Armstrong,57 the Waco Court of Appeals addressed the
admissibility of a third party's assessment of the intrinsic value of a tree.58
Withrow was accused of killing Armstrong's tree during an act of tres-
pass, but the only evidence as to the value of the tree was Armstrong's
46. Bay Area, 239 S.W.3d at 234.
47. Id.
48. Id.




53. Id., superseding Drake Ins. Co. v. King, 606 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex. 1980).
54. Id. at 235 (citing TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 235-36.
57. No. 10-05-00320-CV, 2006 WL 3317714 (Tex. App.-Waco Nov. 15, 2006, pet.
denied).
58. Id. at *2.
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testimony that the he had received quotes for the replacement costs of
the tree of $14,884.38 and $16,161.72. 59 After upholding the verdict find-
ing Withrow liable for trespass, the court of appeals addressed his conten-
tion that no evidence existed to support the jury's award of $5,000,
because the only evidence of the tree's value was inadmissible hearsay.
60
The court of appeals began its analysis by noting that where the cutting
down of a tree does not reduce the market value, a court can award dam-
ages based on the tree's intrinsic value.61 Further, it held that an "owner
may testify regarding the intrinsic value of trees" 62 and that a "party may
testify, based on his personal knowledge if he has performed his own re-
search, as to the cost or value of his property. '63 The court held that the
testimony regarding value was not offered to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted, but was instead offered to show the research that was the
basis of the owner's personal knowledge. 64 Because Armstrong did not
offer the testimony regarding the quotes to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, the court held that the out-of-court statement was not hearsay,
and; therefore, the lower court did not abuse its discretion by overruling
the hearsay objections.65
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. TEXAS ROBINSON CASES
In Guevara v. Ferrer,66 the Texas Supreme Court explored the limits of
when mere non-expert evidence is sufficient to prove a causal connection
between an occurrence and a resulting physical injury.67 At trial, the jury
awarded over $1 million to the estate of the motorist injured in a car
accident. 68 No expert testimony was given to establish causation; rather,
the jury awarded damages based on non-expert testimony that created a
logical connection between the accident and the victim's injuries. 69 The
court of appeals affirmed the jury's finding, stating that the evidence was
legally sufficient to support a finding of causation. 70 It focused on testi-
mony stating that the victim did not suffer from any of his post-accident
injuries before the accident, and relied on the standard that when testi-
mony "establishe[s] a sequence of events which provide[s] a strong, logi-
59. Id. at *3.
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id. (citing Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1984)). According to this
court, "intrinsic value" is defined as the "inherent value not established by market forces; it
is a personal or sentimental value." Id. (citing Star Houston, Inc. v. Kundak, 843 S.W.2d
294, 298 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
62. Id. (citing Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 506).
63. Id. at *3.
64. Id. at *4.
65. Id.
66. No. 05-1100, 2007 WL 2457760 (Tex. Aug. 31, 2007).
67. Id. at *4-5.
68. Id. at *2.




cally traceable connection between the event and the condition," non-
expert testimony is sufficient. 71
However, the Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the El Paso Court
of Appeals and espoused a slightly different standard. 72 The supreme
court restricted when non-expert testimony is sufficient to support a find-
ing of causation by itself. Specifically, the supreme court stated, "[n]on-
expert evidence alone is sufficient to support a finding of causation in
limited circumstances where both the occurrence and conditions com-
plained of are such that the general experience and common sense of
laypersons are sufficient to evaluate the conditions and whether they
were probably caused by the occurrence. '73
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the supreme court found that
the victim's "medical course clearly was not smooth or simple."' 74 As a
result, the supreme court held that the evidence of the circumstances sur-
rounding the car accident allowed "a layperson of common knowledge
and experience" only to find the victim's immediate post-accident condi-
tion, and transportation to and examination in "the emergency room [to
be] causally related to the accident. ' 75 Additionally, the supreme court
determined that this evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the
accident caused all of the victim's injuries and related medical expenses. 76
Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court determined the proper action was to
remand the case for consideration of remittitur with respect to expenses
that required proof via expert evidence.77
B. FEDERAL DAUBERT78 CASES
In Mugworld, Inc. v. G. G. Marck & Associates, Inc. ,79 the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas excluded the testimony of two of the qualified experts for
similar reasons. 80 The court found that their analysis was not sufficiently
reliable because both experts failed to analyze a "statistically significant"
sample of products in a products defect suit.81 In a dispute related to the
sale of allegedly defective goods, Mugworld, the plaintiff, returned ap-
proximately 150,000 mugs to the manufacturer. 82 The manufacturer's ex-
pert on sublimation and coating examined 400 to 600 of the returned
71. Id. (recognizing the appellate court's reliance on Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp.,
675 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1984)).
72. Id. at *5.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at *6. Indeed, after the accident, the eighty-six year old victim remained in the
hospital for four months. Id. at *1. After that, he went in and out of medical centers,
complaining of various ailments. Id. There was also some evidence that the victim had
significant past medical history, including hypertension and renal failure. Id.
75. Id. at *6.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
79. No. 4:05cv441, 2007 WL 2446533 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2007).
80. Id. at *1, 2-4.




mugs and found that 1-2% "contained defects that would make them
commercially unacceptable. '83 The court determined that the analysis of
at most four-tenths of a percent of the amount returned was not sufficient
to render the expert's conclusions reliable under Daubert.84 In addition,
the court determined the manufacturer's second expert's testimony was
not sufficiently reliable under Daubert for the same reason.85 Although
the court did not definitively say what percentage of the sample would
have been sufficient to make the expert's methodology reliable, it is clear
that both experts failed to meet the undisclosed standard.
8 6
In Burton v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories Division of American Home
Products Corp.,87 the Northern District of Texas determined that two fac-
ets of an expert's testimony were unreliable to support a $1 billion award
of punitive damages. 8 8 At trial, the plaintiff's expert presented a sched-
ule to the jury that suggested it should award punitive damages in the
amount of $100 million to $2.5 billon.89 The court determined that it was
improper for an expert to present evidence of possible punitive damages
to the jury.90 The court relied on precedent from the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey in finding that the challenged
testimony carried too great a risk of misleading the jury, especially since
it was based on nothing more than the expert's unsupported opinion. 9'
Second, the court found that "economic impact testimony" was similarly
unreliable. 92 In so doing, the court commented that the portion of the
expert's report that stated a $1 billion award would have no punitive im-
pact on the defendant was unreliable under Daubert because such conclu-
sions "ha[ve] not been tested or subjected to peer review, ha[ve] no
known error rate and ha[ve] not been accepted in the community of
economists. 93
Notably, the court would not go as far as holding that the testimony
giving evidence of the defendant's net worth was improper.94 Further,
the court refused to find unconstitutional the provision of the Texas stat-
utes permitting consideration of net worth when determining punitive
damages. 95 The court recognized that the United States Supreme Court
has held that presentation of such evidence "creates the potential that
juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, par-
ticularly those without strong local presences," but refused to restrict evi-
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *4.
86. See generally id.
87. 513 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
88. Id. at 717.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Voilas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 452, 463-65 (D.N.J. 1999)).
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1251-52 (E.D.
Okla. 2003)).
94. Id. at 717-18.
95. Id. at 718 (citing TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.011(a)(6)).
20081
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dence of the defendant's net worth.96
C. EXPERT DISQUALIFICATION
In Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v. Kajima International, Inc.,97 the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals addressed two issues of first impression
in a rehearing en banc of a prior opinion. First, the court examined
"whether an expert should be disqualified where he was retained by one
side but was somehow related to an expert previously retained by the
opposing party."' 98 And second, "whether the entire firm of experts to
which both of these experts belong should be disqualified." 99 To effectu-
ate the resolution of these issues, the majority adopted the same basic test
outlined in Koch Refining Co. v Jennifer L. Boudreau MV 00 and included
additional factors utilized by other courts in its analysis.10 The court
confirmed that in order to disqualify an expert based on a prior relation-
ship, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that (1) the expert
had an "objectively reasonable basis to believe that a confidential rela-
tionship existed between that party and the expert witness and (2) confi-
dential or privileged information was in fact provided to the expert by the
moving party."'1 02 In addition, the court held that it would apply other
factors, such as "fundamental fairness" and "prejudice," in its analysis. 10 3
Applying this analysis, the court found it was not error for an expert to
testify when (1) he worked for the same consulting firm as an expert re-
tained by the opposing party to perform work related to the litigation for
the movant, and (2) was copied on certain communications between the
opposing party's attorneys and expert.' 0 4 The court held that the movant
did not meet either prong of the Koch test because it could not establish
that it was objectively reasonable to conclude that the movant had a con-
fidential relationship with an expert at the same firm as the one the mo-
vant employed.'0 5 And, the movant did not establish that any
communication the other expert was copied on was in fact privileged.' 0 6
Through this reasoning, the court additionally held that employment of
an expert does not allow for the disqualification of the expert's firm. 10 7
The court noted its analysis was guided by the belief that "allowing ex-
perts to pursue their trade, allowing parties to select their own experts,
and preventing gamesmanship ... outweigh the policy of preventing con-
96. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003)).
97. 216 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied).
98. Id. at 447.
99. Id.
100. 85 F.3d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1996).
101. Formosa Plastics Corp., 216 S.W.3d at 447.
102. Id. at 448 (citing Koch Ref. Co., 85 F.3d at 1181).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 446, 451.
105. Id. at 451.




flicts under the particular circumstances present in the instant case." 108
D. EXPERT REPORT REQUIREMENT OF THE TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE
AND REMEDIES CODE SECTION 74.351
Texas courts continued to broadly interpret the definition of a "health
care liability claim" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sec-
tion 74.351, and thus, when an expert report was necessary to support a
claim. In one such case, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a claim
based on a doctor's alleged breach of confidentiality qualified as a
"health care liability claim" under section 74.351.109 As such, the court
determined that because the plaintiff failed to file an expert report, his
claim should be dismissed.1 10 The court's determination ultimately rested
on its resolution of "whether a physician's duty of confidentiality is an
inseparable part of the rendition of health care services or based on a
standard of care applicable to health care providers." ' 1 While the court
recognized that expert testimony was not necessary to support a verdict
on a breach of confidentiality claim, it commented that the claim was still
a health care liability claim because patient-physician confidentiality is
"inextricably intertwined with the physician-patient relationship and the
health-care services to which the communication pertains."' 12 Ulti-
mately, the court concluded that even though an expert report was not
necessary for recovery, it was required to continue the suit under section
74.351, and therefore reversed the portion of the trial court's order deny-
ing the defendant's motions to dismiss, and rendered judgment in the de-
fendant's favor, dismissing the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. 11 3
Similarly, in Clark v. Tirr Rehabilitation Center,114 the First District
Houston Court of Appeals held that a negligent supervision claim against
a physical therapist was a "health care liability claim," requiring an expert
report to continue the suit.'1 5 The court addressed a claim by the repre-
sentative of a patient's estate against a rehabilitation center as a result of
negligent supervision by a licensed physical therapist. 116 The physical
therapist allegedly failed to watch the elderly patient who fell from a
"balance board," causing her to fracture her pelvis and later die, possibly
as a result of the injuries.11 7 The court relied on a prior Texas Supreme
Court case, which required expert testimony in a negligent supervision
case, to extend the reach of section 74.351 to include claims of negligent
supervision by a physical therapist.1 18 The court reasoned that because
108. Id. at 452.
109. Sloan v. Farmer, 217 S.W.3d 763, 769 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 768.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 769.
114. 227 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
115. Id. at 263-64.
116. Id. at 258.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 261-62.
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supervision is an inseparable part of the service rendered by the rehabili-
tation center, and is also inseparable from the accepted standards of
safety applicable to the rehabilitation center, the claim is properly classi-
fied as a health care liability claim. 119
V. SANCTIONS
A. DEATH PENALTY SANCTIONS
In Van Es v. Frazier,120 the Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a trial
court's imposition of "death penalty" sanctions without an evidentiary
hearing due to the defendant's repeated failure to produce documents or
appear for deposition, overruling Minns v. Piotrowski.121 Plaintiffs had
sued defendant Van Es, a dairy farm operator, and a water supply com-
pany, after the plaintiffs' water supply line ruptured. The water was al-
legedly contaminated with bovine manure and urine from the
neighboring Van Es' dairy.' 22 In both May and August 2005, the trial
court granted motions for sanctions against Van Es, and ordered him to
produce documents, appear with his wife for deposition, and pay $3,000
in attorneys' fees as monetary sanctions. 123 In the order, the trial court
warned Van Es that his pleadings would be struck and he would not be
permitted to conduct discovery or proffer evidence at trial or any hearing
unless he complied.124
Eight months after the initial sanctions order, and after Van Es failed
to comply, the trial court signed its final sanctions order, which struck
Van Es' pleadings and prohibited him from proffering evidence at trial or
any hearing.' 25 A month later, the court issued an order granting plain-
tiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, striking Van Es' summary
judgment response, and awarding actual damages of $581,793 and attor-
neys' fees of $121,171.126 A month after that order, the court held a "fi-
nal hearing"-at which Van Es did not appear-and found Van Es liable
for exemplary damages of $250,000.127
Among other things, Van Es argued on appeal that the sanctions were
an abuse of discretion because the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary
hearing and the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence (at any of the
hearings that were held) to justify the imposition of sanctions. 128 In re-
jecting Van Es' argument that an identifiable evidentiary hearing was re-
quired before death penalty sanctions could be imposed, the court of
119. Id. at 263.
120. 230 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. denied).
121. Van Es, 230 S.W.3d at 776 (citing Minns v. Piotrowski, 904 S.W.2d 161 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1995), writ denied, 917 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1996)).
122. Id. at 773.
123. Id. at 774.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The order also declared Van Es' dairy permit void. Id.
127. Id. at 774-75.
128. Id. at 776, 778.
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appeals looked to Cire v. Cummings,129 in which the Texas Supreme
Court upheld a trial court's sanction of $250 without holding an "oral
hearing" beforehand. 130 The court of appeals also cited Tidrow v.
Roth131-a case in which the Dallas Court of Appeals found it was an
abuse of discretion to issue death penalty sanctions without notice and
hearing-in support of the proposition that death penalty sanctions can
be imposed without an evidentiary hearing.132
The court of appeals also rejected Van Es' argument that the plaintiffs
provided no evidence at any of the hearings to justify the imposition of
sanctions, reasoning that "a trial court may consider factors other than
'evidence,' in determining whether to impose a discovery sanction. Thus,
the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions even though
the [plaintiffs] did not formally present 'evidence' in the sanctions hear-
ings."1 33 Although the court of appeals did not say so explicitly, when
making a determination on death penalty sanctions without evidence, a
trial court may presumably rely on the same factors that the court of ap-
peals must when reviewing the trial court's decision to impose a sanc-
tion-namely, "the entire record . . ., arguments of counsel, the written
discovery on file, and the circumstances surrounding the party's alleged
discovery abuse."'1 34
In contrast to the situation in Van Es, in In re Rozelle,135 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion
in ordering "death penalty" sanctions against a plaintiff who untimely re-
sponded to requests for admissions. The plaintiff had failed to timely re-
spond to the requests during a two-month period in which he was pro se
while searching for new counsel to represent him.' 36 Such requests were
phrased almost exclusively as issue-preclusive legal conclusions, and after
the plaintiff missed the deadline, they were deemed admitted pursuant to
Rule 198.2(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 137 Although the
plaintiff realized his responses were due before the deadline, he ex-
plained that he was "not sure what to do" without the advice of an attor-
ney, and was preoccupied dealing with several personal family issues. 138
After obtaining representation, the plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw
the deemed admissions, which the trial court denied, finding no evidence
that his failure to timely respond was due to "accident or mistake."1 39
Predictably, the deemed admissions became the centerpiece for the de-
129. 134 S.W.3d 835, 843-44 (Tex. 2004).
130. Van Es, 230 S.W.3d at 776.
131. 189 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
132. Van Es, 230 S.W.3d at 776.
133. Id. at 778 (internal citation omitted).
134. Id. at 777-78.
135. 229 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding).
136. Id. at 759.
137. Id. Rule 198.2(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f a response is not timely
served, the request is considered admitted without the necessity of a court order." TEX. R.
Civ. P. 198.2(c).




fendant's summary judgment motion, which remained pending while the
plaintiff sought mandamus relief.140
Based on the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Wheeler v. Green,141
the court of appeals found that when a party attempts to use deemed
admissions to preclude presentation of the merits of a case, due process
concerns arise, and thus the trial court used the wrong standard: it should
have determined whether the plaintiff failed to respond to the requests in
"flagrant bad faith or callous disregard for the rules," instead of whether
he failed to respond due to "accident or mistake. ' 142 The court of ap-
peals found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mo-
tion to withdraw because, even though the plaintiff knew about the
deadline, he was unsure of how to proceed without the advice of counsel
and such conduct does not rise to the level of flagrant bad faith or callous
disregard for the discovery rules. 143
B. AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AS SANCTIONS
In Broesche v. Jacobson,'1 4 4 the Fourteenth District Houston Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order to pay $179,500 in sanction, based
on unnecessary attorneys' fees expended in response to sanctionable con-
duct.145 The suit concerned a divorce decree providing that the ex-wife
was to receive certain oil and gas interests of her ex-husband (a geologist)
and her ex-husband's employer (an oil and gas exploration company). 146
During the course of the litigation, the ex-wife avoided her initial deposi-
tion, claiming that she was sick. 147 At her rescheduled deposition, she
was not prepared to answer questions regarding her damages calculation.
After a hearing the same day, the court gave the ex-wife a day to prepare
and ordered the deposition to resume.148 When the deposition resumed,
she was still unable to fully answer the damages questions. 149 Further,
four hours after the start of the deposition, she disclosed that she and her
attorney had found another box of relevant documents the night before
that had not been produced before the discovery deadline. 50 Despite
her protests to the contrary, the trial court found that the ex-wife's failure
to produce the documents was not inadvertent.' 51
In addition to the discovery shenanigans, the trial court found that a
series of incidents surrounding the Christmas holidays also constituted
140. Id.
141. 157 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. 2005) (per curium).
142. In re Rozelle, 229 S.W.3d at 764.
143. Id.
144. 218 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
145. Id. at 274-75.
146. Id. at 270.
147. Id. at 275-76.






sanctionable conduct. 152 Specifically, the ex-wife hired co-counsel on De-
cember 23, 2002, and immediately prepared a motion for continuance,
even though trial was scheduled for January 6, 2003, with a December 27,
2002 deadline for exchanging draft jury charges and motions in limine. 153
Instead of informing opposing counsel about the motion for continuance
or serving the motion by facsimile (as had been practice throughout the
litigation), the ex-wife's counsel served the motion by mail by driving to
the airport post office late that evening.1 54 Counsel for the ex-husband
and his employer learned of the motion on December 26, after working
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day to meet the deadlines. 155 After all
this, the new co-counsel never drafted any pleadings and only made one
court appearance. 156 Despite the ex-wife's counsel's argument that sanc-
tions were inappropriate because she violated no rule of civil procedure
in serving by mail, the trial court found that the motion for continuance
was for the purpose of delay, and therefore frivolous and in bad faith, in
violation of Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 157 Based on
the above facts, the court of appeals found that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the attorney for the ex-wife
should be sanctioned for his conduct, even if he did not violate a specific
rule or statute. 58
C. SANCTIONS IN SUITS INVOLVING INTERESTS OF CHILDREN
This year, two courts of appeals separately addressed sanctions in suits
affecting the interests of children, and in doing so, illustrated that, in such
actions, reviewing courts may look to how the proposed sanctions relate
to the standard concerning the best interests of the child. In In re CH.,159
the children's grandparents and mother were each vying to be managing
conservator of the children. The grandparents had named twenty poten-
tial witnesses 160 nine days before trial and eighty-one days after the trial
court's deadline and, accordingly, filed a motion to modify the discovery
cut off. 16 1 Despite the plain language of Rule 193.6(a) of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure, which prohibits a party from offering testimony of a
non-party witness who was not timely identified unless the court finds
there was good cause for the failure or it will not unfairly surprise or
prejudice the other party, the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the







158. Id. at 276-77.
159. No. 07-04-0428, 2006 WL 3813751 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Dec. 28, 2006, no pet.).
160. Id. at *1. These witnesses included six of the children's teachers, eight character





deadline because the trial court permissibly evaluated the benefits to the
children of a fully-informed decision by the jury.162
In contrast, in Glash v. Glash,163 the Fourteenth District Houston
Court of Appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion in award-
ing additional child support-in excess of the statutory guidelines-
where the trial court appeared to award the additional child support as a
discovery sanction. 164 Aside from noting that the record lacked any or-
der compelling discovery, and that the father was afforded no notice or
opportunity to respond to the allegations that he had violated discovery
orders prior to the entry of the judgment, the court of appeals reasoned
that the trial court's primary responsibility in a modification of child sup-
port proceeding is to consider the best interests of the children, not to
punish an offending party.' 65 Accordingly, the court of appeals modified
the trial court's judgment to delete the portion of the child support not
based on the statutory guidelines.' 66
VI. SPOLIATION
In Gilmore v. SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc.,167 the Waco Court of
Appeals held that a spoliation instruction could be given in cases that
involve the loss or destruction of evidence even when there is no allega-
tion of discovery abuse. 168 The plaintiffs appealed from a take nothing
judgment arising from an incident at a graveside service when a lowering
device failed and the casket tipped and fell to the bottom of the vault.169
On appeal, the appellants raised several issues, including that the court
erred by failing to submit a spoliation instruction to the jury because the
lowering device was discarded when the company determined it could not
be repaired.' 70 The defendant primarily argued that no spoliation in-
struction could be given because "such an instruction is available only as
a sanction for discovery abuse."'171 The court relied on prior Texas Su-
preme Court language that "Texas courts 'have generally limited the use
162. Id. at *2.
163. No. 14-05-00846, 2006 WL 2862217 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 10,
2006, no pet.).
164. Id. at *3.
165. Id. The court of appeals apparently did not consider that a greater amount of child
support might be in the best interests of the children.
166. Id. at *4.
167. 234 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. denied).
168. Id. at 262-63.
169. Id. at 253-54. According to witnesses, as the casket was being lowered, the lower-
ing device emitted a ratcheting sound, there was a "big boom," and after the casket fell it
"was partially opened by the impact, [the decedent's] arm was exposed[,] and several me-
mentos fell out." Id. at 254.
170. Id. at 262-63.
171. Id. at 262. It should also be noted that the defendant argued that the jury found
him negligent even without such an instruction, so any error would be harmless. The court
recognized that it would agree with this argument if it were affirming the judgment, but
since it was reversing and remanding the cause, and because the record was not fully devel-
oped with respect to this issue the court decided to not address it. In addition, the court
noted that spoliation was discussed to guide the trial court on remand. Id. at 262 n.11.
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of the spoliation instruction to two circumstances: [1] the deliberate de-
struction of relevant evidence and [2] the failure of a party to produce
relevant evidence or to explain its non-production." ' 172 The court rea-
soned that while the second instance typically involved discovery abuse,
the first did not, and therefore, could be the basis for a spoliation instruc-
tion outside the context of discovery abuse. 173
In Adobe Land Corp. v. Griffin, L.L.C.,174 varying aspects of spoliation
were addressed by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals. The suit, brought
by a group of farmers against a manufacturer of herbicide, sounded in
products liability, breach of warranty, and negligence. 175 After applying
the defendant's herbicide to their fields in 2000, the plaintiffs' crops failed
to produce sustainable amounts of alfalfa, and eventually, all of their
plants died. In 2002, the plaintiffs filed suit; but at that time, when the
plaintiffs requested samples of the batch of herbicide they were given, the
defendants claimed they were unable to produce the sample without an
identifying lot number.176 After further discovery, the proper lot number
was uncovered, but by that point defendant had already destroyed the
sample pursuant to its normal internal policy requiring the destruction of
lot samples after three years. Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted
defendant's no-evidence summary judgment motion, disregarding the
plaintiffs' spoliation allegation. 177
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that it was improper for the trial court
to grant no-evidence summary judgment as to all of their claims, when
the defendant failed to specifically seek no-evidence summary judgment
on plaintiffs' spoliation claims.178 The court disagreed with this conten-
tion, because "allegations of spoliation do not give rise to an independent
cause of action under Texas law, and accordingly do not constitute claims
subject to attack by way of a no-evidence motion for summary judg-
ment." 179 The court further noted that, while Rule 166(a)(i) requires a
no-evidence motion to be specific, it does not require the defendant to
attack evidentiary components that may ultimately be used to prove the
challenged element.180
Although the court of appeals overruled the plaintiffs' argument, it ul-
timately reversed the trial court's ruling, holding that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a presumption of spoliation.181 The court rejected the defen-
dant's contentions that the company did not believe the sample was rele-
vant to the claims asserted in the petition and that it could not have
172. Id. at 262 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex.
2003)).
173. Id.
174. 236 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
175. Id. at 354.
176. Id. at 355.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 356.
179. Id. (internal citations omitted).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 361.
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
preserved the sample because the batch was discarded before the batch
number was identified. 18 2 The court found that the filing of the original
petition in the case put the defendant on notice that at least one of its
retained samples contained material evidence relevant to the plaintiff's
claims, and the plaintiffs' inability to identify the specific sample did not
relieve the defendant of "its duty to preserve all potentially relevant"
samples.'i 3 Because the plaintiffs were clearly prejudiced by the destruc-
tion of the sample, they were entitled to a spoliation presumption, and,
consequently, the trial court erred by granting defendant's no-evidence
summary judgment motion.'8 4
In Baker v. Federal Express Corp.,185 the First District Houston Court
of Appeals addressed the effect of a settlement on sanctions for spolia-
tion. The plaintiff brought a negligence action against a mail carrier for a
car accident involving one of its mail delivery trucks.18 6 At a pre-trial
hearing, the trial court indicated that it did not intend to give a spoliation
instruction related to the mail carrier's inability to locate the relevant pre-
and post-trip inspection reports for the truck at issue; however, on the
first day of trial, the court communicated its willingness to reconsider the
instruction.187 Upon arriving at the court the next day, the parties in-
formed the court that they had reached a settlement, and, subsequently,
the plaintiff moved for a nonsuit recognizing the controversy had been
settled.188 However, the plaintiff still sought sanctions against the mail
carrier for spoliation. l8 9 According to the trial court, sanctions for spolia-
tion could not be fully evaluated because the case did not go to trial, and,
as a result, the court sanctioned the mail carrier in the amount of
$1,000.190
The plaintiff appealed the ruling, arguing that by indicating that it did
not intend to give a spoliation instruction, the court impaired the presen-
tation of his case.' 91 The court of appeals gave this argument no credence
and concluded that the plaintiff waived his right to complain about the
ruling by settling his case. 192 The court further held that the settlement,
although it did not specifically address spoliation sanctions, constituted a
full and final settlement of all complaints, which, according to the court,
included the request for sanctions based on spoliation. 193 Despite this
holding, the court did not reverse the award of sanctions completely be-
182. Id. at 358-59.
183. Id. at 359 (emphasis in original).
184. Id. at 361.
185. 224 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
186. Id. at 391.
187. Id. at 392-93.
188. Id. at 393.
189. Id.
190. Id. (because of the limited amount of the monetary sanctions and the fact that the
court would have not awarded sanctions if they had been challenged by the sanctioned
party, the court noted the award of sanctions "should make you all unhappy").
191. Id.




cause only the plaintiff, and not the mail carrier, challenged the sanction
award.1 94 In sum, following this analysis, the court seemed to suggest
that settlement of a case should result in the dismissal of any request for
sanctions stemming from spoliation. 195
VII. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. WAIVER
Most of the cases dealing with the evidentiary issues in alternative dis-
pute resolution proceedings during the Survey Period addressed what
constituted a waiver of the right to arbitrate. Some recent cases illustrate
what behavior does and does not constitute a waiver of one's right to
arbitrate. Although the law of waiver is mostly settled, it is painted in
broad strokes, and some recent cases illustrate what behavior does and
does not constitute a waiver of one's right to arbitrate.
Texas courts have long held that "there is a strong presumption against
waiver" of the right to arbitrate. 196 In order to find waiver, the party
attempting to negate arbitration must show that the party seeking arbitra-
tion has substantially invoked litigation to its opponent's detriment and
that the party attempting to negate arbitration has suffered prejudice as a
result.197
In LJA Engineering & Surveying, Inc. v. Richfield Investment Corp.,198
the Beaumont Court of Appeals addressed a mandamus petition claiming
that the plaintiff had not sufficiently rebutted the strong presumption
against waiver. In the underlying action, the plaintiff brought suit on a
number of causes of action, including breach of a contract that included
an arbitration clause. 199 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defen-
dant waived arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process to
their prejudice in three ways: defendant filed a motion to dismiss because
of an insufficient expert affidavit, the defendant failed to timely pursue
arbitration, and that the defendant engaged in extensive discovery.200
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the strong
presumption against waiver because the motion to dismiss might not have
been dispositive, because the burden is on the plaintiff to initiate the arbi-
tration, and because the information gained from "extensive discovery"
was simply information that could have been discovered in the arbitra-
tion.201 The court summarized its holding by stating that, "[i]t would
seem incredible that any party could 'substantially invoke the judicial
process to its opponent's detriment' during a little over six months into
194. Id. at 395.
195. See generally id.
196. In re Bank One, N.A., 216 S.W.3d 825, 827 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding); In re
Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
197. In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d at 704.
198. 211 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, orig. proceeding).
199. Id. at 445.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 446-47.
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litigation" where the claims are complex and there will be significant doc-
ument and expert witness discovery. 2
0 2
There is, however, a fine line between the actions in LJA Engineering
& Surveying that did not constitute waiver and the behavior of the party
that was found to have waived arbitration in Interconex, Inc. v. Ugarov.
20 3
In Interconex, the defendant challenged the ruling of the trial court deny-
ing its motion to compel arbitration.2 0 4 The defendant was hired to move
the plaintiff from Moscow to Houston, and out of this relationship the
plaintiff sued for breach of a contract that included an arbitration
clause. 20 5 In this case, the court concluded that the defendant substan-
tially invoked the judicial process by failing to timely answer the lawsuit,
requesting the case be reset from an initial trial date to a date two months
later, and for failing to file a motion to compel arbitration until ten days
before the jury trial.20 6 Here, there was no evidence that the defendant
sought final resolution of the dispute, acquired access to information that
would not have been discoverable in arbitration, or other specific behav-
iors that had been previously held to be sufficient evidence to show
waiver; instead, the defendant was simply subject to a default judgment
and delayed in asking for arbitration.2 0 7 As delay and the taking of solely
defensive measures are not normally sufficient evidence to prove
waiver,20 8 the First District Houston Court of Appeals found that the
prejudice of waiting until ten days before the trial on damages to seek
arbitration coupled with the fact that the plaintiff procured a flight from
Ukraine to attend the trial constituted enough prejudice to the plaintiff to
outweigh the strong presumption in favor of arbitration. 20 9
B. ADR COMMUNICATIONS
In Rabe v. Dillard's Inc.,210 the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed the
competency of communications made during a mediation session as sum-
mary judgment evidence. In Rabe, the plaintiff brought a negligence ac-
tion against defendant Dillard's. The parties subsequently conducted a
mediation, at which the plaintiff's attorney was authorized to execute a
settlement agreement on her behalf.2 11 The plaintiff's attorney signed the
settlement agreement, but the plaintiff then refused to sign the settlement
documents and the dismissal. 21 2 The defendant moved for summary
judgment on a breach of contract counterclaim based on the settlement
202. Id. at 447.
203. 224 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
204. Id. at 527.
205. Id. at 528.
206. Id. at 535.
207. Id.
208. In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding); In
re Serv. Corp. Int'l, 85 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2002).
209. Interconex, 224 S.W.3d at 535-36.
210. 214 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
211. Id. at 768-69.
212. Id. at 769.
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agreement, which was granted by the trial court. 213 The Dallas Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff's only evidence that contra-
dicted the enforceability of the contract was an alleged threat made by a
Dillard's attorney during the mediation. 214 The court of appeals upheld
the summary judgment, reasoning that because "[c]ommunications made
during an alternative dispute resolution procedure are confidential, [they]
may not be used as evidence. '215
VIII. PAROL EVIDENCE
In Haden v. David J. Sacks, P.C.,2 16 a law firm sued its former client to
collect unpaid invoices. The client retained the law firm for representa-
tion in an appeal to the Fifth Circuit.217 To memorialize this representa-
tion, the firm sent a written engagement letter reciting the attorneys' and
paralegals' hourly rates and that the client would owe a $10,000 retainer
to be applied to the fees and expenses incurred during the representation.
The client returned the letter with his signature, altering the original re-
tainer amount to $5,000, and subsequently submitted a check in that
amount. The appeal continued, and the firm sent an invoice reflecting an
outstanding debt of approximately $35,000. The company paid $5,000 at
the end of the year, but no more payments were made.218 The law firm
then sent multiple invoices, requests for payment, and finally a demand
letter before it filed suit for breach of contract. The client immediately
counterclaimed, contending that the firm had promised to render legal
services for a maximum flat fee of $10,000. The trial court rendered take-
nothing summary judgment on the client's counterclaims and granted
summary judgment to the firm on its breach-of-contract claims.219
On appeal, the client challenged the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on the law firm's claim that the client breached its contract. In
the court below, the client submitted affidavit testimony regarding the
promise of the $10,000 flat fee. In response, the law firm contended that
this affidavit contravened the parol evidence rule and was therefore inad-
missible.220 Answering this contention, the client opined that this affida-
vit was admissible as an exception to the parol evidence rule; specifically,
the testimony involved evidence of a collateral, contemporaneous agree-
ment consistent with the engagement letter, and was therefore admissi-
ble. 221 Analyzing the substance of the engagement letter, the court found




216. 222 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. granted), rev'd in part
by 2008 WL 2702184 (Tex. 2008), rev'd in part and remanded in part by 2008 WL 2718262
(Tex. 2008).
217. Id. at 584.
218. Id. at 584-85.
219. Id. at 588.
220. Id. at 590.
221. Id. at 592-93.
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[the client] and the company in the appeal to the Fifth Circuit, (2) [the
client], individually and for the company, acknowledged the law firm's
hourly rates, as well as responsibility for all disbursed expenses, and (3) a
$5,000 retainer fee, instead of the $10,000 retainer proposed, would be
paid.12 2 2 However, the court determined that the contract shed no light
on the terms in dispute, specifically, whether they had agreed to an open
account or a flat maximum fee.223 Because the engagement letter con-
tract did not clarify whether the agreement was to "pay billing as accrued
at the hourly rates acknowledged in the engagement-letter contract," a
majority of the court determined that the parol evidence rule allowed the
client to assert that, in addition to the engagement letter, an additional
agreement with the law firm for a flat maximum fee existed.
22 4
Dissenting with respect to the breach of contract finding, Justice Alcala
stated that he would have held that the parol evidence was inadmissible
and that the written documents establish a clear meeting of the minds.
2 25
Justice Alcala explained:
The undisputed evidence show[ed] that [the firm] and [the client]
entered into a written agreement that provided that the law firm
would "assist with the writing of the Appellant's Brief and any reply"
and that [the client] would pay for the service, at a rate of $200 per
hour for [the attorney's] work, $150 to $200 per hour for work done
by other lawyers in the firm, and $50 to $100 per hour for work done
by paralegals, plus all costs and expenses.22 6
Because the dissent found that "[t]he agreement here is sufficiently
definite that any court could enforce the terms . . . " it determined that
the parties came to a meeting of the minds and that only inadmissible
parol evidence supports the client's breach of contract claim.
227
IX. CONCLUSION
This article is intended to update litigants on recent developments in
the field of civil evidence and to provide litigants with tools helpful in
navigating evidentiary issues in Texas. During this Survey Period, the
Texas Courts of Appeals continued to broadly construe the definition of
health care liability claim in regard to section 74.351 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, although the Texas Supreme Court has yet
to affirm their broad interpretations. Also, important decisions were is-
sued regarding the snap-back rule, the disqualification of experts, and ad-
missibility of parol evidence.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 593.
224. Id. at 591, 593 (emphasis in original).
225. Id. at 598.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 599-600.
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